4

NATO's ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: Is THE ALLIANCE OBSOLETE? Benjamin Forster
Sin ce th e o u tb reak o f th e " W ar on T err o r" foll o wing the Se ptem be r l l th terrori st attacks, NATO has been stru gglin g to rapidly ad apt its political and military strategies In ord er to [Ice th e tr an sformed threat o f global terrorism . NATO has ind eed d eveloped innovati ve new ways of tackling th e issu e o f global terrori sm. th ough it faces a numb er of significant difficulties, w hic h, if not addressed, w ill likely m ean t hat NATO will be a minimall y effective force in th e fight again st glo bal terrori sm.
In th e analysis th at follows, I wi ll fIrst exa m ine tw o important o utco mes of th e 2002 Pragu e su m m it of the Eu ro -Atlanti c Partner sh ip Co u ncil (E APC): th e Allianc e's Mil itary Conc ept for Defense against T errorism (MCDT ) and the Partn er ship Action Plan again st Terrorism (PAPT ). Togeth er th ese comprise NATO's first fram ew orks for addressing th e issue of terro rism. As w e w ill see, though both pro vide much n eed ed basic fram ew orks in o rde r for N ATO to address th e issue o f te rrori sm effect ively, eac h presents uniqu e di fficulti es th at mu st be addressed if NATO is to have a significant ro le in th e broad er W ar on T err o r. I w ill th en exa mi ne SOIne o f th e pr act ical applicatio ns o f th e Pra gu e su nu n it 's fram ew o rk s, such as NATO cou n terterr o rism and antiterroris m op erations , as w elJ as th e Allian ce' s int elligence and co nseq uence managem ent capabilities. Fin ally, I conclude by examining four separate shortcomings of NATO's cu rre nt counterterr o rism and antiterrori sm capab ilities: NATO's lack o f a co h erent count err err o rism poli cy, falte ring intelligen ce ca pabiliti es, di sconnect amo ngs t m ember states du e to separate nati on al lo yalti es and th e illusive nature of terrori sm , and po ssible diffi culties assoc iated with , and th e larger impli cati on s o f increased int ern atio n al coope ratio n .
In thi s paper I will not fo cus on NATO 's participati on in Afghanistan, but rath er NA T O 's ro le in preventing and counterin g th e type of terrori sm seen during th e 2001 World Trad e Center att ack s, th e 2004 Mad rid bombing, and the 200 5 London bombing. Thu s, th e "War on Terro r" as used in thi s analys is w ill refer to th e broader glo bal fight ag;linst ter rori sm, and not sim ply th e U S-led W ar o n Terror. This pap er w ill also refer to antiterro rism . and cou nterterro rism . In thi s ana lysis, antiterrori sm w ill refer to pr eventative , d effn sive measures take n to pre vent atta c ks (su ch as th e use o f su rvei llance), w he reas co u nte rt erro rism w ill refer to th e use of pr eemptive offensi ve actio n to pr e vent ,1 possib le ter rori st atta ck .
PRAGUE SUMMIT
While th e NATO coll ect ive defense frdme w o rk had m ade pr e viou s atte m pts at add ressing the issu e o f internati on al terrorism , m ost notabl y ill the Allian ce 's 1999 Strategi c C o nce pt. til e Alliance's fmt fo rma l address of tile issue wa s at th e 2002 NATO Pragu e su mm it m eeting of th e EAP C (de N e ve rs). During that su m mi t, th e Alliance esta blished w hat has become NATO 's o ffic ial polic y to wa rds terrori sm . nam el y th e Milita ry Concept for Defe nse against T errorism , and th e Partne rship Anion P lan agains t Terrori sm. While the re are a number of sign ificant sh o rtcom ings of th ese plans, in line w ith the strat egies develop ed by th e EAPC at th e Pra gu e su n mut , NATO has play ed a sma ll but sig n ifica nt role In th e broade r War o n Te rro r, pa rtic ularl y th rou gh an tite rro rism o pe rations.
Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT)
The 20 02 Prague summit meeting's Military Concept for Defense aga inst Terrorism (M C D T ) pla n stipulates th at "all membe rs [will] hav e th e primary resp onsibility for t he defense o f th eir populati ons and infrastru ctu res" w hi le NATO w ill pla y d m uch m ore supporti ve role for in di vidual nati on s' co u nte rte rro rism and ant ite rro rism initi at ives (" NATO's M ilitary C on cep t" ) . The M C D T outlin ed fo ur different role s for NATO 's mi lit ary o pe rations: defense m easures (antite rrorism), co nseq ue n ce lllan agement, co u n terterro rism , and military coope ratio n (w it h n on -military forces as well ) w it h further NATO assistance di ctated by th e No rt h Atla nt ic C o unc il (K uz ma n ov) . As stip ula ted by th e M C DT, specifically, defe nse m easures (ant i-terro rism) incl ude intelligen ce sharing; co nseq ue nce managem enr co nsists of post-att ack containm ent and d isaste r reli ef (in t he case of a nu clear , biol ogical, or chemi cal w eapo n att ack); counterte rrori sm consists o f "offensi ve military acti on in w hic h NATO eith er play s a support ive o r le.id role" th rou gh out-of-ar ea operations o r pr e-empti ve strikes; fin ally, milirary coopera tio n co nsists bo th o f int cr-ru ember (J S w ell as no n-me m be r) civilia n law e nfo rce m e nt and military coope ratio n, JS w ell as strictly traditio nal inte r-m emb er (an d no n-m ember) mil itary cooperatio n (D e n i) (" N AT O 's M ilitary C o ncep t") .
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT)
The sum mi t's Partnersh ip Ac tio n Plan aga inst T errori sm (PA PT) has becom e th e main p latfo rm for j oi n t Partn er s for Peace (PIP) and NATO m emb er coo peration in addressing th e issue of ter ronsiu, with ad d itio nal efforts made to co o p e rate with n on PiP or N ATO m embers (K uzma no v) . Th e PA PT has p rovid ed a five p oint framework fo r co nt in ued internati onal coope ratio n . These areas include : inten sified co nsulta tio ns an d information sha ring, e n hanced pr ep aredness fo r com bating te rrorism , th e need to impede su ppo rt for ter rorist gro up s, to e n ha nce capabil ities to contribu te to conseque nce managem e nt, and assistance to partners' effo rts against terr orism ("Pdrt n ership Acti on Pl an agamsr T errorism"). Th e PA PT has also establishe d th e need for close NATO and non NATO m ember cooperati on, th rou gh politi cal, logistical, e co n o mic, and tec hno logica l (adapting co -compatibl e milita ry techn ologi es) m eans . C lea rly th e PAPT is an important leg,tl step in establishi ng th e cooperatio n n ecessary for effective antiterrorism and co u n terterrorism o pera t io ns, th ou gh it also p resents sign ificant probl ems th at \",1111 be d iscussed later in thi s analysis, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/6
NATO's OPERATIONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
Th e pr acti cal application of these NATO initiatives in fightin g terrorism has had limited suc cess. Perhaps NATO's two largest roles m th e m o re bro adl y defi ned War on Terror have bee n th rou gh anti-terrorism operations aim ed at d et errin g terrori st attacks, as well as th rou gh co nseq ue nce mana gement (aiding m em be rs III t he eve nt of a terrori st attac k). The M C DT , and parti cula rly th e PAPT's plan of close coo peratio n am o ngst NATO , and PfP me m bers h,IS been a ke y co m po nen t o f both o f these roles. I w ill also ex am ine some o f the rece nt c ha nges in N ATO 's in relligence capahilities as w ell as its limited role 111 co u ntc rre rron sm .
Counterterrorism
Wi th regard s to co u nterte rro rism o peratio ns, N AT O , as stipulated in th e-M CDT , has taken o n a very "supporti ve " ro le in the b ro ad er W ar o n T er ro r, and has therefore had a m in im al rol e in o ffensive o pera tion s. T o d ate, N ATO 's o nly major offe nsive Art icle 5 o pe ratio n has been in Afghanistan w here it h.is played ,I largely su ppo rtive role of the U S (Kuzm ano v). Whil e thi s study of NATO 's ro le in th e b roa de r W ar o n T erro r will not exam ine NA T O's o peratio ns in Afghani stan in deta il, it is important to no te th at N AT O has played a promin ent role in counterterro rism hy training civilian and military personnel both Treaty") . In this sense, the op erati ng natu re of the NRF is a clear depa rt ur e from NATO 's more traditional reactive role. T he NRF , w hile not without sign ificant op eratio nal limi tat ion s rhur will he discussed later, is N ATO's "state o f th e art for ce" that will allo w the Allian ce to rapidly respond to terro rist th reats. This me ans th at th e N RF w o uld act as a tip o f th e spe ar action for ce co m p rised o f th e best o f the Allian ce 's m ilitary fo rces, and wo uld act in accordan ce wi th N AC m andates. T he go al o f th e NRF is to e ngage member s and non members int o m or e pro acti ve , rath er than react ive engage me n ts o f te rrori st threats ("T O pe ratio n Active End eav or began p rim arily as a NATO naval operation 111 th e E astern M ed ite rran ean , and began in 200 1 as J "dete rrent and surveillan ce m eas ure in suppo rt o f US int er ventio n in Afgh anistan " (de Neve rs). Ac tive E ndeavo u r wa s see n also as a w ay to preve nt p ossib le terro rist atta ck s fro m Lib ya, and Syria, which , as o f 2003, w e re consid er ed by th e U S to be haven s for te rro rist g ro u ps (K uz rn anov) . By 200(" the O per atio n had e xpanded to incl ud e no n N ATO m emb e rs suc h as Russia, w hic h briefly parti cipa ted in pat roll in g th e Eas tern M ed iterran ean in 200() and 2007_ T oday Active End eavour has ex pa nded sig ni fielntl y th ro ughout th e e nt ire M editerran ean, primarily as a symbol ic gest ure o f NATO 's contin ued resolve to cou n ter inte rnatio nal te rro ri sm . But the Opera tio n is much m o re th an sim ply a sym b o lic ges tur e : NATO patrol s have part icipated m sea rc h an d seizure of sus pe ct ruarerials, pr c ve nred d rug sln ug gling a nd w ea po ns trafficki ng, a nd th e o p e ratio n h as bee n ex tre m e ly su ccessfu l in g uarding ov e r 65 pe rce nt o f W estern E urope' s oi l su pply, whic h is tr an spo rted th rou gh th e M ed iterra nea n . Acti ve E nd eavour ha s also allo w ed for in creased clos e cooper atio n with Egy pt , M oro cco , J ord an , Israel an d oth er states that ar e active ly seeki n g to co m bat te rro rism in th eir resp ecti ve co u nt ries ("Op e rati o n Active Endeavo u r" ). N A T O has also re vam ped its intelligen ce capab ilities to m eet the new threats p osed by ter ro rism , tho ug h w ith sig nificant limitati o n s. N ATO itself is se verely limited in the field of in tell igen ce as it itself d o es not co lle ct "raw intellige nce", b ut rath er relies o n its m en iher cou nt ries' o w n dom estic in te llige nce serv ices . In ,HI effort to be tter po ol intell igen ce gathe red fro lll vario us m em be r nat ions, in 200::1 NATO esta blished a Terrori st T hr eat In tellige nce Uni t along w ith an NATO Intelligen ce F usio n Cen ter to co o rd inate int e lligen ce gath er ed by members (D e ni). This initiati ve, w h ile a step i n th e righ t direction , wa s m et w ith sign ificant diffi culti es w hich will be exa m ine d in depth lat e r. NATO's Multin ati on al Battl efield Info rm .itio n and E xp loitat ion System (M B rES) is also a way fo r NAT O to p oo l intell ige nce resources regardi ng te rrorism , in to a sing le ne tw o rk th at is readil y accessible to N AT O task forc es (D eni ) .
Consequence Management
NA TO's consequ en ce ma nagc uient plan, in line with th e P rag ue summi t M C DT, has establi shed a number of m ul tina tio n a l NBC co nt ainm e nt p ro gra m s. O ne of these pr ograms , NA T O 's Ci viJ E me rgenc y Pla nn i ng Act io n Plan (C E PA P) , is th e Alliance's p re m ier pos t atta ck co n raim ne n r p rogra m tha t has pooled e no rts fonn a var ie ty o f me mbe rs and Pa rtn er s. NATO 's C hemi cal B io logica l R adi oact ive a nd N ucl ea r D efe nse (C B R N) Ba tta lio n. also established du rin g th e P rag ue summit , plays a similar role as w ell. A mong t he primary o bj ectives o f the CBRN D efe nse Battali on are the identifi cati on o f nu clear , biol o gi cal, an d ch emi cal th reats, and dec o nta m inatio n op er ati o ns (Kuzmano v) . In line with th e Prague sum m it's co m mi tm e nt to in cr eased coope ration bet ween m e m be rs an d PfP m em bers, 12 d iffer e nt nati o ns take part in C B R N rotati onal dep loymen ts, with th e C B RN head q uarters based in and staffed in th e Czec h R epu blic (" N AT O's Mul tin at io nal C hemical," ) . Int er estingly, NATO's increa sed capab ilities in NBC weapo n co nta in me n t, co nseq ue nce m ana gem eu t , and sur veillan ce , have give n N AT O a hi gger ro le in di saste r relief In fact , the Allian ce 's Euro-Atlanri c D isaste r Respo nse C en te r assisted th e U S dunng Hu rri cane Ka tri na, and Paki stan dunn g th e 2005 earthq uake (de N evers).
LIMITATIONS OF NATO's CURRENT ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
D esp ite all of N ATO 's ca pabilit ies in waging " w a r" ag ains t te rro rism, it no ne th el ess h as sig nifican t limitations in its capabilities . T h is sec tio n ana lyzes these sho rtc o m ings in four http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/6 spe cific areas : co u urerte rro risni. inte llige n ce, m ember nation state lo yalties and the nat ur e of th e broad er W ar o n Terro r, and problem s em an atin g fro m expanded int ernation al coo pera tion.
NATO's Lack of a Legal Counterterrorism Provision
In regards to NATO's o pe ratio nal cap aci ty , NATO 's lack of a pr e-e mptive co un te rte rro rism pro vision in the M C DT , has n ot o nly limited N ATO to brgel y reactive o per atio ns, bu t it has fur tlier e nbrged the gap bet w een US an d NATO ca pab ilities (de N e ve rs ) . Wh ile th e N orth Atla nti c T rea ty's colle ct ive d efen se pla n assures an 'all fo r o ne. o ne fo r all' suppo rt of m e m be rs In tile eve nt of a ll arrac k , th e Pragu e suu u ui t d id not esta b lish ,I legal provision for o ut of area co u nt e rte rro rism o perations (no n-A rt icle 5), but ruth er state d that th e decisio n fo r act io n m ust COllie fro m th e NAC , wh ich is inextri cab ly bound b y th e N orth A tla nt ic Treaty (B e hler) . NATO has th us es tablishe d it self as a fo rmidable react ive , not proac tive force . Th is has frequ entl y co nflic ted w ith U S sec ur ity poli c y w hich , d u riug th e Bush admi n istrati on, wa s hi ghl y proa ct ive, foc using o n elim inating th rea ts before th e y su rface d , as op p osed to NATO 's policy o f add ressing thr eats once th ey surface . to th e e ne my " , a nd e m p hasize th e need to pr ev e nt attack s before they occ ur (d e N e vers) .
It is thus clea r tha t desp ite t he ex iste nce o f th e va rio us anti te rro rist (preve nt ative) pro g ram s N ATO has p ur su ed follo wi ng ':>/JI, NATO as a for ce in the figlit again st pr e venting and elim ina ting glo bal terror is seve rely lacking in this resp ect . The fact th at NATO is largely a reacti ona ry force , a nd that it is o fte n difficul t to m obili ze , sugge sts a m ajor reason w hy the Bush ad mi nist ratio n d id not see k N ATO aid during th e in vasion o f Afg hcl nistcl n . M ost co u ntert erro rism effo rts am on gst NATO m em bers tod ay occu r bilate rally as a result of th ese an d o the r sh o rt co mings (Beh le r). The effective nes s of th e NATO R eacti on Force wi ll also be sig nifican tly co m p ro m ised d ue to the lack o f a countert e rrorism provi sion in the M C DT, a nd m e m b e r nat ion s w ill likel y be h ighly relu ctan t to take o n an y typ e o f action th at m ay excee d the m an date o f th e N orth Atla n tic Treaty . As J ohn D eni , a U S pol itical ad viso r to U S forces in E urope notes, despite th e im po rta nce of the N R F in NAT O 's co u nt e rterrorism progr<lm, NATO lias r , • • • barely proved able to mu ste r th e requisite forces -forces that th e Allianc e it self id e nt ifie d as necessar y fo r the NRF to be functi on al .. .including co u uterte rro rism [o perati ons]" (De ni). It rem ain s unc lear w heth er thi s lack in req uisite fo rces is ,I d irect resu lt o f NATO 's lack o f a legal co unterte rro rism pro vision that co u ld potentially o b ligate m embe rs to provide fo rces for t he NRF. Unless N ATO C I Il successfully add ress th.is issu e, th e Alli ance will u nd oubtedly face significant politi cal confli ct wi th the U S (u nless o f co ur se U S p o lic y o f pre-empti on changes) in years to come .
Alo ng simi lar lines, N ATO 's co nse q ue nce ru.magcinen r o p e ratio ns, suc h as its NBC co nt ainm e nt pro grams, can o nly be depl o yed u po n co nse nt of th e m embe r nation ill w hic h the co ntain m e nt o p eratio n w ill be d epl o yed . While ant ite rro rism o peratio ns (pre ve ntative o pe ratio ns) su ch as Ope rat ion Active En deavour are b eyo nd th e Article 5 co n strain ts u nder w h ic h co u n te rte rro rism (pre-e m ptive o p eratio ns) is co nd ucted . it is n oneth ele ss co nstra ine d, th ough o nly to ,I co m parative ly sm all de gree, by d iffering nati on al lo yalt ies amo ngs t m e m be rs.
Faltering Intelligence Capabilities
Anothe r a rea in w hic h NA T O 's strategic cap abilities are lac kin g is in the area of intel-NATO's Role in the Global War on Terror ligen ce . Th ough, as illustrated earlier, NATO h as made a num ber o f attempts at creating intelligen ce pools , NATO in and of itself h as no intelligen ce gath erin g capabiliti es o ther th an th rough its A W AC S su rveillance operatio ns. As a resu lt , alm o st all of NATO' s supplied inte llige nce com es froln th e U S Intelligence Com m u n ity . and o the r mem ber states' co unterpart o rgani zatio n s. A s R enee d e Ne v ers from th e M axw ell Sc hool at Syracuse Un iversity poi n ts ou t , not only is NATO lacking in int ellige n ce ca pabi lities, but its m em ber s o fte n hav e' differing values of int elligence. For exa m ple, as US and Eu ropean military cap ab ilities di ver ge , th e US has bec om e more reliant On real-time Intelli gen ce as part of its evo lving speci alized co un terterro rism capabilities. Eu rop ean allies ho w ever. have comparativ el y less spec ialized program s ge ared to ward terrori sm and rhu s hav e a co m parative ly lo w er value of real tim e int elligen ce (de N e vers). It sho uld be noted th at thi s d iscrepan cy is largel y influe nced b y differing threat values placed o n te rrori sm by both th e U S and th e Eu ropean coiu m uniry, a confli ct that w ill be ex amin ed in d epth later in th is ana lysis. Furth er m o re , th e legal im plications su rro u nding the gath e rin g of human intelligen ce have caused co nfliers bet w een European NATO members an d th e US, whi ch ha ve diffenn g view s o n what co nstitu tes legal and illegal intelligen ce g'Jthe ring (Behler). These confli ct s within th e int ell igen ce pooling arm o f N ATO ha ve sig n ifican tly imped ed upon NAT O 's in telligen ce ca pabilities. NATO has tried to remed y thi s situatio n notabl y throu gh its crea tion o f th e N AT O Int elligence Fu sio n Ce nte r, th ou gh its cre atio n hJS had very littl e p ract ical eHect in easing m ember nati on tensions. Rath er , N ATO 's creati on of numer ous intelligence po ols hav e furthe r added to NATO's bureaucrati c thi ck et, and as ;1 result have furth er und ermined NATO 's efficiency.
Diverging Political Interests amongst NATO Members and the Nature of Modern Terrorism lu tem al discord am ongst NATO m em bers p rimarily du e to di ver gin g nati o nal int erests, co m bined with th e nature of the ter rorist threat itself, illu strate a potential sho rtc o mi ng of NATO's role in fightin g terrorism. All to o frequently, th e co m pe ting and chan gi ng nation al age nd as of m ember nati ons hav e m ad e d ecisive acti o n very difficult, m ost notably in Afg hanista n, and w ill likel y m ak e non -Article 5 pr e-emp tive mi ssio ns extrem ely d ifficult to execu te in th e future . O nce again , it is important to not e th at U S secu rity poli cy is geared m o re towa rd pr e-emptive m easures w h ile Eu ro pean sec u rity p ol icy is gea red m or e to ward reacti ve secu rity. Thi s d iscre pancy IS a key facto r 111 expla ini ng th e disconn ect that exists between Europeans and th e US over h o w to b est deal with th e terrorist threat (Be hler). Ind eed th er e are oft en "se rio us disagreem ents co n cern ing th e au th o rized scope o f o pe ratio ns and Ico nce rn ing] sev eral proposed d epl oym ents of the IN R F]" (B ebler). W hil e th e US in recent years has begu n to see the ben efits of multinat ion al coope ratio n, European NAT O m em b ers, o fte n citing th e case of Iraq , are highl y co nce rn ed th at the U S m ay be tr yin g to ad va nce its o wn po licy agenda th rough NAT O (de N e v e rs). Fu rth ermor e , there is also signifi cant discord bet w een the US and Euro p ean NATO m emb e rs o v er th e sign ifican ce of th e terrorist threat . Fo r exam ple, unlike th e Se ptem ber 11 th terrorist atta ck s, th e Madrid and Lond on terrorist bombi ng s m 2004 aud 200 5 resp ecti vely, we re not link ed to Al Qaeda, b ut we re rat he r co nd uc ted by do m estic ter rorist g ro ups (de N ever s). M an y critics of NATO 's ro le in th e W Jr o n T error cite th is as a reason w hy dom estic intellige nce se rvices an d civilian poli ce for ces o r eve n an E U spo nso red co u n te rt erro rism pro gram mi ght be better su ite d for dealing wi th such issues rath er tha n N A TO , w h ic h seems m or e gea red to w ard s http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/6 collecti ve militar y d efe nse (D e n i) .
T h is point ties in to th e larger pr oblem th at exis ts: the nature of ter ro ri st th rea ts th e mselv es. De spite the m an y an tite rro ri sm and co u n te rte rro rism p rograms de velo p ed by NATO foll o wi ng th e Pragu e sum m it, NATO still m aintains Its highl y bureaucrati c stru ctur e whi ch do es no t give it the spee d necess ary to respond to terr o rist th rea ts. Furtherm ore, as stated ea rlier, N AT O's co nseq ue nce man agem ent p ro gr am s suc h as nu clear, bi o logical and ch emical we apo n attac k contain men t m ust h ave the app rov al o f t he given co u ntry in w hich th e pro gr am will operate p rior to its lise . Addi rio nally, while N ATO m aint ains its N R F fo rce s, it do es n ot maintain a sm all scale paramil itary task for ce w h ich might be idea lly suit ed for hostage crises, and do m estic te rro rism . For t hese reasons critics often argu e th at Internati on al o rgani zations suc h as the E U or th e G -8 have d e velop ed suffic ie n t m rer-age u cy co o pera tion fo r fighti ng terrori sm , and th at N AT O need not risk co m p ro m ising its trad itio nal military fu nct io na lity in o rd e r to fight a "war" whic h it is not ideally su ited for (Kuzm anov ). A long th ese lint's, there ha s not been , and wil l likel y nor be for ma ny ye ars, a clear co nse nsus as ro wh et her NATO, th e EU , bilateral o r u nilateral ani on is be tt e r suited for add ressing rh e h ig hl y illusive terrorist th reat. There are ind eed many pros and cons of eac h o f th ese alt ern ativ es, an analysis of w hich is be yond th e sco pe o f th is paper alo n e . Giv en th e internati o nal natu re o f rerro rist gro ups suc h as Al Qaeda today, th e rol e o f internati onal o rga nizatio ns wi ll be esse ntial. H en ce o ne of th e m os t imp ortan t ro les NATO wi ll play in th e broader War on T error w ill most defi nitel y be irs coope ratio n w it h PH> m ember s, and t he cultivati on o f co op er ative efforts o ut side of the Alli an ce and rhe PfP . In this resp ect, th e Alliance 's Partnership Action ag;linst T errorism wi ll be a key laun ch pad from which fu ture cooper ative effo rt s o f thi s nature ca n OC CU I".
Difficulties with Expanding NA TOMembership and Non-member Cooperation
Th e downsid e of further intern ati o nal co o pe rat io n is that it wi ll likel y co n flict w ith NATO 's co llect ive d efense role. G ive n th e transn ati onal nature of m od ern terrori sm , N AT O is highl y u n iqu e in that ir is th e most effective inrernarional sec urity organizati on in th e w o rld . In a se nse, NATO's uni qu e p ositi on raises q uestions as to w he the r e m er ging in te rua tional co unte rte rro rism p rogr am s, suc h as rhe EU 's R apid R esp onse Fo rce , will be able to achi eve w ha t th e Alli an ce has (Kuzm anov) . W hatev e r t he case ma y be, to day's securi ty threats d eman d everm o re int e rn ational co o p e rati on. While un ilate ral ani o n ma y avoi d th e co nfi nes o f add itio na l b ur eau cratic red tap e thar is often th e resulr of div e rgin g Int erests amo ngst NA T O m embers, th e use o f int erna tiona l co o pe ration provid es a lev el o f lcgirim .icy to m ilit ary int erve ntio ns, In fighting m odem terrori sm. W esle y C lark , fo rm er Sup rem e Allied Comma nde r Euro pe says, gain ing in te rn atio na l publ ic ap proval is essentia l 111 launch ing an y successfu l militar y in c ur sio n (Clark ]()). For e xam ple . in th e case of the current [rag war, uuil areral military actio n has ignited an " us versus th em " mentality in th e Midd le East by d e n ying rh e coop eration wi th allies thar is necessary for estab lish ing internati o nal leg itim acy (C lark 1(2). Co nve rsely , d ur in g t he l 'i lJ() Gulf W ar. coo p eratio n w ith Ar ab state s g,lVe th e incursion th e inte rn atio nal legiti m acy necessar y to mak e ir th e success that it w as.
Whi le the U S has bac ked sig nifi cant N AT O ex pansio n , suc h as in 2004, m any arg ue th at NATO's rapid ex pansio n is sev er el y co m p ro m ising its military cap ab ilities. As de N e vers po int s o ur, foll o w in g N A T O 's 1999 ex pansio n, it w as clear to exi stin g m embers th at th e co untri es adm itte d , nam el y th e Czech R ep u blic , H u ngary, an d POLlIld, we re signifi can tly lack ing in mi lita ry ca pa bilities b y N ATO stand ards . Foll o wing NATO 's 2004 ex pansio n , in w hic h Bulgaria , Esto n ia, Lat via , Lithuania, Slova kia , Romani a , an d Slov e nia became m emb ers of the Alli an ce, it was clear th at these countrie s were even 1I1 0re lacking in m ilit ury ca pab ilitie s, and th at th e y were 1I0t abo ut to meet NATO 's minimum m ilitary standard s any rim e so o n (de N e ver s). T he pomr here is th at th e cos t o f ex pansio n, w h ich w ill be esse ntia l in ad d ressing th e issu e o f terrorism . ma y ve t)' well be a d et eri orati on o f N AT O\ mil itary standa rd s to in clud e m ore member s and fo ster greate r n on -member coope ratio n .
NATO e xp an sio n also poses a threat to NATO 's ex istin g m ember ship requi rem ents. G iven that modern terro nsm does n ot discriminate be tw ee n dem o crati c and non -d em oc ratic states, it w ill be in cr easin gly difficult for NATO to fo ster close coope ratio n with 1I 0n -m ember sta tes , or to allow for th eir m ember sh ip if one o f NATO \ ke y requirem ents for m ember ship is d em o crati c gove rn allce (Be ble r) . H o w ever, th ere a re clea r ben e fits o f e x pa nsio n i n regards to ant ite rro rism and co u nte rte rro rism . Ex pa nsio n cou ld po te n tially p ro vid e political and ec onomi c stability for eille rgi n g dem o cr acies 111 Europe , w h ic h is essential in d et e rr ing terrorism from taking ro ot (She a) .
D avid Y o st w arns tha t g row in g m embership co uld also hav e u ninte nded consequ en ces, such as rei gniti ng th e NATO-Russia ri val ry as fo rm er Sov ie t po w er s e nte r o r ad o p t increasingly clo se cooperat io n w ith NATO (Yost 125). This co uld potentiall y d etract from t he ov e rall purp ose o f increasin g co o pe ratio n in d ealin g w it h te rro rism. E ven if ex pa n de d m e mbership seem s lik e a stretch, close co o p e ratio n in line with the P AP T presents its ow n pro bl ems as w eU. Th e more PiP and NATO m embe rs interact with eac h other stri ctl y o n tr ainin g gro u n ds, the g reate r a ro le NATO w ill ha ve in transformi ng non-member mil ita ry forces to be co-com pa tible . For exa m ple , the PAPT stip ulates th e ne ed fo r in creased political and lo gistical co o p e ratio n wi th non -member s, and to d e vel op co m pa tible iuilitarv units th rou gh joint tr aini n g exerc ises (" Pa rt ne rship A ct ion Plan agai nst T erro rism") . H en ce , this will make it increasin gly more diffi cult for NATO m embers not to int ervene wh e n a non-NATO member is atta cked. Furth er , co llective sec urity implies NATO invol vem ent In no n -A rtic le 5 mi ssio ns w h ich could pote ntially cau se" .. .an erosion o f NATO 's co here nce as a collect ive d efe nse o rga n izatio n d u ring th e pursuit of a diffuse collect ive sec urity ag reem ent " (Y os t 166).
The risk s asso cia te d with NATO 's increased c oope ra tio n w it h non-member s, co u pled wit h the necessity o f international coope ratio n in fighting terrorism, begs the qu estion : w h y NA T eV As m e nti on ed earlie r, w he n co nside ring th at NATO w as born out o f w estern sec urity fears durin g th e Cold W a r, it is unlikel y th at an y future eve nt s, give n rod ay's po litica l com plexi ties . th at an eq ually co hes ive collectiv e de fe nse o rga niza tio n co uld be crea te d . W esley Clark po in ts o u t that g iven t he diffi cultie s associated w it h bilate ral coope ratio n , suc h as differing laws, j ud icial procedures e tc ., that o fte n tim es terrorists w ill be cau ght and released. According to C lark , "Altrui sm and fellow ship are not enough to briug oth er nations fully into th e fig h t ag ainst terrorism , Rath er, th eir internation al ac tions follo w d om estic age ndas " (C lark 128). The ve ry nat ure o f NATO as a p olitical-military forum also fo rces allie s to d e velo p co-com pa tible secur ity poli ci es, e ma na ti ng fro m com mo n sec ur ity issu es. w h ich ar e in tu rn tr anslated in to d om esti c p o licies by forc ing govern me n ts to d efen d the i r international po siti ons at how e (C lark 128). B y d oing this, NAT O p romotes co llective JCti o n a nd burd en sharing whi ch are esse n tial 111 takin g on issues as m assive as transnati onal ter rori sm.
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WHERE SHOULD NATO GO FROM HERE?
Whik t he re are no clea r solu tio ns to m .mv o f th e apparent diffi culti es that NATO will Illc viubl y (;Ice with rega rd s to its recent anrircrrorism .uid co u n te rterro rism progral1ls, th er e are SOllie so lu tio ns th at suggest th emsel ves. Perhaps o ne o f NATO 's g reatest we ak nesses ill the broad er War o n T er ror wi Jl be its m assive bureaucrati c structu re. Anton Behl e r, from th e U n ive rsity of Lju blj una suggests th at NATO im p rove th is by creat in g a sepa rate forum for counterterrorism within NATO. As Be hler suggests, eac h NATO mem b er state should have its own civilian paramilitary liaison to NATO, whi ch co uld better coordin ate NATO aid to each m em ber's loc al sec urity o r NBC co u tainm c nr units as needed. Within thi s se pa rate forum . Behl er sugg ests. an titerrorism a nd co u nrcrte rro rism d ecision m ak ing sh ould be streaml ined by m ergin g repetiti ve sub-p ro gr.u us (suc h as th e n um be r o f N ATO 's inr elligeu ce p ro gr am s) (Be hler). Whil e NATO 's R ea cti on Forces co uld be p ot entiall y wel l equipp ed to address small scale co nventio nal co nflicts (i.e . through th e use of m o b ile infantry, m ech ani zed divisions etc.), th ese forces arc not appro p riate in d ealing with small scale operati on s such as hosta ge re sc ue, NBC contain m ent, etc. For thi s reason. smaller scale NATO paramilitary u nits w ou ld be better suite d fo r sm all sca le co u nte rt e rro rism o pe rations. If NATO is to be J suc ces sful force in fighting terrorism, its m ost critical tasks ahea d w ill be in addre ssing th e in he re nt problems w ith its int elli gen ce capab ilities. to esta blish a defmiti ve co unte rte rro rism pr o vision . and to ad d ress the issu es of in te rn atio n al co ope rat ion , milita ry structure , core d octrin es. and interna l d isco n nect amo ngst m ember s. H o w e ver . d ue to the c risscrossing nature of the se problems, solving one will lik el y c reate others in its place . NATO m em ber s will ha ve to be w ary of thi s as th e y try to adapt existing military and political do ctrin es and struc t u res, to m ee r th e sec ur ity d emands o f th e 2 1sr ce ntu ry .
CONCLUSION
1n co ncl usio n , NATO d oc s ind eed have significant antite rr o rism capabi lities throu gh A WA C S o pe ratio n s, NBC co n tainmen t. and military training p ro gram s. Toda y's NATO will be m ost effective 111 th e area of antiterrorism and consequ en ce management, th ou gh it w ill also be pa rtic u larly effec tive in maintainin g active peacekeeping o peratio ns. and th rou gh intern ati on al co o pe ratio n it will be an extremel y useful to ol III providi ng p oliti cal and econ omi c sec ur ity . Despite th e inherent problems w ith NATO 's c ur re nt ro le in fighting terrori sm , th ere is little c hance th at an equally effectiv e int ernati onal sec ur ity o rga n izat io n w ill em erge an y time soon. As suc h . NATO w ill be a vital forum for int e rn atio n al co ope rati o n in th e bro ader WJr on T erro r. and extending NATO cooper ati on to non-membe rs will be c ru cial in elim inating tran snational terrori sm . While th e 2002 P rague suuunir wa s an Impo rtant first ste p for NATO in reshaping itself to add ress th e issu e o f terrorism, in and of itself it is ( \I' from su ffici e nt in addressin g all o f NATO 's potential p rob lems w ith regard s to its poli cies o n terrorism . If N ATO can addr ess th e pr oblems illu str ated in thi s a na lysis effectivel y. it co u ld potenti ally play d vital and e ve n a leadi ng ro le in th e broad er War o n T erro r. view Process (PA R P) will give pri o rity, alllong other s, to Partnership G oa ls aimed at imp ro vin g th eir capabilities to participa te III activ ities aga inst terrori sm . Such Partnership G oals w ill be identified within PARP and wilJ also be co n uu un ica ted to Partners not parti ciparin g in th e PA.RI' p ro cess -for in formati on and to e nco urage equivalent effo rts by non-PARP co u nrries. 16.2 .5. Training and exercises. Partn ers w ill be invited to participate in trainin g opportunities and exe rcises related to terro rism to be coordinat ed by SACEUR I SACLANT. T o t he exte-n t possible . the Partn ership Work Progr amm e will pr o vid e m ore antiterrori sm relat ed o ppo rt un ities an d activities in th e field o f training and exe rcises. Ex erci ses w ill also be used to share expe rie nces in th e fight again st terro rism. l(1.2 .6. Armaments co-operation. E APC States w ill make use of N AT O .mnam ents co-o peratio n m ech ani sms under C N AD , as appropri ate, to devel op co nu n o n, or as a minimum interop erable equipment so lutio ns to m eet the requirem ents o f activities aga inst terrori sm . 16 specific te rro rism-rela ted issues In ord er to share specific ex peri ences in combatin g te rro rism . E xe rcises 111 the spirit of PrP wi ll also be actively used for sha ring ex perien ce s in co m ba ting ter rori sm .
ApPENDIX B: EXTRACT FROM NATO's MILITARY CONCEPT FOR DEFENSE AGAINST TERRORISM
MILITARY OPERATI ONS C ounter T errorism -G en e ral Counte rte rror ism is o ffensive milit ar y action d esig ned to redu ce te rrori sts' capa bilities. Allied nat ions ;Igre e that terrori sts sho uld no t he allowed to base, train, plan , stage and exec ute terror ist acti ons and th at the th reat l11a y he seve re eno ug h to j ustify acting again st these te rrori sts and th o se w ho harbo r th em , as and w here req uired, as d ecided by th e North Atlant ic Council. Cou nt er terrorist o pe ratio ns will he m ainly Joint op er atio ns and so m e units spec ifically train ed in Counter T erro rist operati o ns might he extrem ely effective. Furth erm or e. w in n ing the tru st of th e lo cal populati on th ro ugh Psych olo gi cal Op eratio ns and Infor m at ion O pera tio ns is vital. Th e Conc e pt add resses two bro ad ro Jes fo r NA TO's invol vem en t in C o u nter T erro rist o pera t io ns:
N ATO in the Lea d NATO in support C o u nte r terro rism -NA TO in th e lead T he Conc ept states th at in o rde r to cany o u t succ essful C o u nte r T errorism o pera tio ns, NATO mu st hav e ad eq ua te Couu naud and Co ntrol and int elligen ce struct u res, as w e ll as forces trained, exercised and maintain ed at th e ap pro priate read in ess level s. W hile th e cap abiliti es needed to succe ssfully execute Co unte r Terrorist o pe ratio ns are largely a su bset o f th ose needed to carry o ut m o re traditi on al j o int o peratio ns, th e manner in whi ch the co nflict w ill be fou ght w ill be differ en t. T her efo re the foll ow ing planning aspects n eed special atte nti on:
Pro cedures and capa bilitie s that suppo rt accelerated d ecisio n cyc les, in o rde r to be NATO's Role in the Global War on Terror succ essful In detectin g and attacking tim e sensitive targets in th e Counter T err o rist euv iro u menr Access to flexibl e and capable J oint-Fi res, rang ing from precision-guided stand-off we apons to direct co n ve ntio nal fires Th e nee d for m or e spec ialized anri-re rrori st fo rces An y suc h arm ed atta ck and all measure s tak en as a result th ereof shall in nn ediatel v be rep orted to th e Secu rity Cou nc il. Suc h m easur es shall be rerminared w he n the Sec u rity C o u nc il has tak en th e mea sur es necessary to restore and maintain int ern ati on al peace and sec u rity. 
